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Abstract. As it encountered a fiscal event (budget liquidity crisis) 
in 2009, Romania should have proceeded to one of the most ambitious 
fiscal correction in the last 30 years in EU. Nevertheless, the absence of 
vision regarding the increase in quality of the fiscal adjustment is 
obvious. The fiscal correction made until now has rather been a 
quantitative one, falling within certain strictly numerical targets. In this 
paper, we present a series of signals arguing for the necessity to increase 
the fiscal quality. Moreover, we propose a few immunization mechanisms 
of the Romanian economy against the contagion of the current 
uncertainty in the Euro area or against the future crises. 
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Introduction 
 
The economic crisis showed that Romania did not have good policies in 
good times. The pro-cyclic policies represented the main factor of the 
macroeconomic drifts recorded during the period 2005-2009. On the other 
hand, it is obvious that the methods for the analysis of the fiscal and budgetary 
policy's efficiency during the pre-crisis period – based on the analysis of the 
real budget deficit – proved to lack relevance (Table 1).  
 
Table 1  
The cyclic budget deficit and the structural budget deficit in Romania 
                                                                                                               – %GDP – 
Years Output  gap  Structural budget deficit 
(% real PIB) 
Structural budget 
deficit 
(% potential GDP) 
2000  -1,55 -3,86 -3,43 
2001  -0,57 -3,22 -4,06 
2002  -0,60  -2,56 -3,89 
2003  -0,91 -2,14 -3,78 
2004  0,86 -1,09  -2,96 
2005  2,60  -2,70 -1,42 
2006 6,05  -4,36  -4,91 
2007  8,81 -5,16  -6,13 
2008  9,13  -8,57 -7,06 
2009  -1,92  -8,26 -9,11 
2010  -4,00 -6,53 -8,26 
Source: Author's calculations, 2011. 
 
The estimation of the cyclic budget deficit and of the structural budget 
deficit has been made according to the EU method, in 3 stages: a) The 
estimation of the gap between the real gross domestic product and the 
potential gross domestic product (potential GDP), according to the method 
recommended by the European Commission – the production function 
method, according to the procedure described by Denis et al. (2006); b) The 
estimation of the cyclic component based on the output gap and on the 
sensitivity of the budget deficit; c) The estimation of the structural component 
by means of eliminating the cyclic component out of the current budget 
component (see details in Socol, 2011). 
Romania makes a purely quantitative adjustment, with future consistent 
payment delays (half-wits, amend for those who obtained the revenues recovery 
in court etc). Even though Romania has the second most ambitious fiscal Quantitative vs. Qualitative in the Romanian Fiscal Adjustment 
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correction program (with an annual average fiscal adjustment speed of 1.9% of 
the GDP with reference to the decrease of the structural deficit), the quality of 
the fiscal adjustment is poor. There are a few signals showing this fact: 
The first one is related to the analysis of the budget executions from the 
second half of 2011. We may easily notice that the positive evolution of the 
budget revenues are firstly due to the consistently higher returns from VAT 
(which increased from 19% up to 24%) and from the increase of the excises. 
The private environment is not stimulated to make investments and to create 
jobs. The decrease of consumption has determined constant nominal evolutions 
regarding the tax on profit and the tax on salaries and on income (even real 
losses of 4.5% for the tax on profit and for the tax on salaries). The rigidity of 
the budget expenses have not decreased, with reference to the goods and 
services (plus 11.5% on nominal, showing the incapacity to clean the budget 
system of corruption, the persistence of half-wits etc.) and to social assistance 
(minus 2.4% only, reflecting the incapacity to correspondingly aim to the 
assistance forms for the vulnerable persons). The decrease of the costs with the 
personnel in 2010 and 2011 is a good thing, but it is not actually but a payment 
delay for them. The budget execution shows that the total savings regarding the 
costs with the personnel, by means of income cuts proposed during the period 
between June 2010 and June 2011 are approximately 2% of the GDP, almost 8 
billions of RON, and the amends won by the public employees in court during 
the last year are 8 billions of RON, too. So, actually, the austerity measures in 
these fields only represent a deficit which is delayed until the period 2013-
2014, when these amends should be paid, and they will be indexed to inflation. 
The high increase of the costs with interests is also worrisome (plus 27.3% 
nominal, plus 22% real) showing financing difficulties and the increase of the 
burden for the next generations. Last but not least, the increase of the capital 
expenses (plus 16.5% on nominal) represent a positive but weak signal for the 
stimulation of the economic growth. Weak because the public investments do 
not represent a priority, generating low multiplication effects.  
The second signal for the low quality of the fiscal adjustment in Romania 
is related to the fact that there are no consistent programs for creating jobs. The 
economic crisis has strongly struck the Romanian labour market, the total of the 
employees decreasing by 640,000 persons during the period September 2008 – 
August 2011 (according to the data from the Romanian National Institute of 
Statistics, 2011). The result is high pressures upon the budgets for social 
assistance, pensions, unemployment, health etc where higher and higher deficits 
are recorded.  Cristian Socol 
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The third signal may be argued by making an analysis for the dynamics 
related to the contribution of the total factor productivity to the economic 
growth.  The IMF forecasts and those of the National Forecast Committee 
regarding the contribution of the production factors to the economic growth 
are not consistent with each other. In case both International Monetary Fund 
and National Forecasting Commission of Romania forecast an average   
2.8-2.9% economic growth rhythm for the period 2010-2015, when the 
factors' contribution to the economic growth are detailed, there are significant 
differences between the calculations of the two institutions. If IMF anticipates 
a major contribution of the capital factor to the economic growth (3.4 
percents) and a negative contribution of the total-factor productivity (TFP) 
(0.4 percents), NFC estimates an average contribution of the capital factor 
which is much lower 1.2 percents) and a significantly positive contribution of 
the TFP (1.6 percents). This means that IMF considers that the intensive 
elements of the economic growth – TFP contribution – institutional 
development, add on the technical progress, research development innovation, 
competitiveness increase, add on investments in human capital, financial 
markets maturity etc. – have a lower contribution if compared to the extensive 
ones – keeping the sustainable growth model – while NFC forecasts a change 
of the model by predominant elements of economic growth quality until 2015 
(Dinu et al., 2011). 
The fourth signal is related to the high decrease of the Romanian 
economy's potential. Romania's post-crisis economic potential is half of the pre-
crisis one. The potential GDP increase ratio decreased to a half of that from the 
pre-crisis period. If during the period 2005-2008 Romania had a potential GDP 
increase rhythm of 5-6%, the studies show that it will get decrease to 2.5-3% on 
a medium term. The IMF estimation regarding Romania's economic growth in 
2012 got decreased from 3.7-4% to 1.5-2%, i.e. to a half.  
The fifth signal is related to the fact that Romania has the lowest degree 
of absorption of the European funds. If we exclude the pre-financing, we find a 
real degree of absorption of 4% only. 
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Table 2 
The situation of the structural and cohesion funds' absorption by Romania 
(December 31
st 2010) 
– Mil. Euros – 
 
Total 
allocations 
2007-2013 
Payments - december 2010 
Absorption 
rate (%) 
Absorption, 
exclusive 
prefinancement 
(%) 
Total, 
from 
which 
Prefinan-
cement 
Ramburs-
ments UE 
Regional 
development 3,726  554.9  381.4 173.5 14.9  4.7 
Environment 4,512  318.5  266.2 52.3  7.1  1.2 
Infrastructure 4,565  47.2  0.0  47.2  1.0  1.0 
Competitivity 2,554  251.2  106.3 144.8  9.8  5.7 
Human capital  3,476  464.2  416.6  47.6  13.4  1.4 
Administrative 
capacity 208  10.2  4.1  6.1  4.9  2.9 
Technical 
assistance 170  9.0  1.2  7.8  5.3  4.6 
Total   19,211  1655.3  1175.8 479.5  8.6  2.5 
Source: Autority of Coordination Structural Instruments, Fiscal Council calculus. 
 
On march 31
st 2011, the absorption rate increased by 1.5 – 2 percents for 
each program. Totally, the absorption rate increased from 8.6% at the end of 
2010 up to 11.06% at the end of the first quarter of 2011. if we exclude pre-
financing, the indicator corresponding to the real absorption is of approximately 
4% of the total EU assignments for Romania, related to the period 2007-2013.  
Starting from the signals listed before and considering the last evolutions 
of the global economy (especially the turbulences determined by the Euro area 
sovereign debts crisis), we may agree that the risk of overlaid crises in the 
Romanian economy has not passed. It is obvious that Romania should avoid the 
black scenario given by the series of internal shocks which degrade the 
macroeconomic environment  the uncertainty of the financial markets 
increases  CDS explodes  we enter a partial default – determined by the 
impossibility to access the external markets + high depreciation of the RON  
liquidity crisis of the budget and so on. We must admit that the vicious circle 
can be broken with difficulty as we are inside it. The solution of fast indebtness 
does no longer represent an observable option, as Romania has exceeded the 
sustainability threshold for the total public debt estimated to 37% of the GDP 
for a while. Any additional loan will deepen the low economic growth rates, 
and it will put pressure on the real rates of interest and it will make economy 
less immune to the future crises.  Cristian Socol 
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The following question arises: what has to be done to immunize the 
Romanian economy? We consider that, firstly, a pack of institutional measures 
is necessary (this paper will only make reference to this type of measures).  
The introduction of the fiscal rules in Constitution. Setting up a fiscal rule 
of 0.5% of the GDP as a target to be reached by the structural budget deficit 
until 2016 + a rule for limiting the public debt to maximum 45% of the GDP, 
with corrective actions at certain thresholds.  
Then, it will be necessary to settle a crisis cell in the Minister of Public 
Finances, which should implement a series of early fiscal stress/ fiscal warning 
indicators, according to the method proposed by IMF. The crisis cell will 
implement a report including two signaling instruments: an indicator for the 
fiscal vulnerability, which permanently measures the degree of fiscal 
vulnerability, and an indicator for the fiscal stress, which provides an 
assessment for the Romanian economy's tendency towards extreme “events”, 
such as non-fulfillment of the fiscal obligations and high peaks in the extent of 
the interest rate  (methods detailed in Baldacci et al., 2011). 
In order to efficiently benefit from the financing opportunities existing on 
the market, the Minister of Finances should conclude cooperation partnerships 
with investors brokerage companies existing on the international capital 
markets. Moreover, the Minister of Finances should implement partnerships 
with famous bank consortiums which should prepare the entrance on the 
external credit markets in a very short time under favorable conditions. 
Romania should base on the experience of the brokers and of the bank 
consortiums in order to speculate the financing opportunities occurring over 
time, thus reducing the costs with the loans for refinancing the debt or for 
covering new expenses.   
Setting up the Economic Programming and Forecast Council (by 
restructuring the CNP), an institution which will settle Romania's strategic and 
development directions, by means of orientative economic programming. CPPE 
will elaborate a sectoral development strategy, based on the analyses made by 
the economic research institutes, with reference to the competitive advantages 
available to the Romanian economy. During the second stage, CPPE will 
propose a method to prioritize the public investments (the next step being to 
provide multi-annual financing for the listed investments and to game on the 
public and private partnership solution for the other investments, their sale or 
providing financing from extra-budget sources only). By means of its available 
supports, the government will involve the economic agents in this new 
development pattern. The state will make massive and prioritary investments, 
which will stimulate the economy. Municipal bonds and fiscal facilities will be 
given for investments in infra-structure, in research and development, in the Quantitative vs. Qualitative in the Romanian Fiscal Adjustment 
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human capital, in renewable energy, in IT, in ecologic agriculture and in other 
superior fields. By means of the multiplying effects of these public funds, 
orders will be given to the private companies, which will begin to make 
investments. The subsidies and the state assistance will be conditioned and they 
will be prioritarily given to the highly competitive potential sectors, settled in 
the CPPE analyses. CPPE will quarterly monitor the efficiency of investing 
such public funds towards strategic directions settled according to the EU 
system of structural indicators. 
An emergency could also be the implementation of a pack of measures 
for the faster absorption of the European funds. The negotiation with EU for the 
re-assignment of the structural and cohesion funds for Romania + the realistic 
estimation of the degree of absorption regarding the European funds until 2015 
+ the remaining amounts enter an Economic Re-launching Fund together with 
the amounts which have not been attracted by the other cohesion countries + 
application to EC with reference to the amounts related to co-financing not to 
be included in the deficit + declaring VAT as exigible.  
We consider that Romania should continue the fiscal correction, moving 
the focus on mechanisms related to the continuous fiscal discipline, to the 
prioritization of the public investments, to sustainable reforms in education and 
health and also schemes for the stimulation of the private investments in field 
with high added value. 
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